Intelligence ​in War 1 csillagozás

The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy
John Keegan: Intelligence in War John Keegan: Intelligence in War

Intelligence gathering is an immensely complicated and vulnerable endeavor. And it often fails. Until the invention of the telegraph and radio, information often traveled no faster than a horse could ride, yet intelligence helped defeat Napoleon. In the twentieth century, photo analysts didn’t recognize Germany’s V-2 rockets for what they were; on the other hand, intelligence helped lead to victory over the Japanese at Midway.

In his characteristically wry and perceptive prose, Keegan offers us nothing short of a new history of war through the prism of intelligence. He brings to life the split-second decisions that went into waging war before the benefit of aerial surveillance and electronic communications.

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Vintage, London, 2004
432 oldal · puhatáblás · ISBN: 9780375700460
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Pimlico, 2004
464 oldal · puhatáblás · ISBN: 9780712666503

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Kiemelt értékelések

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John Keegan: Intelligence in War

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy

Több évvel ezelőtt kinéztem ezt a könyvet (a magyarul megjelent változatát beszerezni esélytelen volt), de a végső lökést a Keegan évforduló és egy elérhető Pimlico kiadás adta meg. Érdemes volt beszerezni.
A brit történésztől megszokott monográfia helyett háborús hírszerzési esettanulmányokat kap az olvasó. A mű elejére került az Acknowledgements fejezet, aminek érdekessége az, amint a szerző pár oldalban köszönetet mond az MI6-nek, hogy megpróbálta ifjúkorban beszervezni, hiszen ez a kezdeményezés keltette fel az érdeklődését a téma iránt. Az izgalmas felütést egy rövid fogalommagyarázat, majd egy általános történeti áttekintés követi.
Az első esettanulmány Nelsonról szól, amint üldözi Napóleont – aki Keegant ismeri, tudja, a híres brit admirális nagy kedvence volt. A következő fejezet számomra igazi kuriózum volt: egy amerikai polgárháborús közeg, ráadásul a déleik szemszögéből!
Ezután jön az első és második világháború időszaka – az előbbinél a szerző Von Spee portyázásával szemlélteti a vezetéknélküli hírszerzést 1914-ben, míg az utóbbinál Kréta, Midway és az Atlanti-csata kap egy-egy tanulmányt, ahol az Enigma és más kulcsok feltörését ismerhetjük meg. Végül a V1-V2 és Falklandi háború történetét elemzi Keegan, a könyv zárásaként pedig egy nagyon jó összefoglalót kap az olvasó, ahol a bemutatott időszakok egymással is összehasonlításra kerülnek.
A kitűnően szerkesztett műben minden fejezet tartalmaz a témához vágó, részletes térképeket, amelyek segítenek az események követésében. Ugyan voltak olyan fejezetek (Nelson, Shenandoah Valley, Crete és a Secret Weapons), amelyek megizzasztottak, mégis azt mondom, John Keegant eredeti nyelvén érdemes olvasni.


Népszerű idézetek

robertbardos P>!

Dividing force is a violation of a cardinal military principle.

130. oldal, Wireless Intelligence

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy

robertbardos P>!

Had Nelson only contained his impatience, the French would have been sailed into his hands. Twenty-five hours after he departed Alexandria, the Armament anchored to the east of the city and began to send the army ashore. This was Nelson’s second, perhaps third, even fourth near miss. But for the gale, he might have caught Bonaparte coming out of Toulon. But for his anexiety to protect Naples, he might have devastated the Armament at Malta. But for his refusal to follow the ‘strange ships’, he might slaughtered the Armament at sea on 22 June. Had he but waited a day at Alexandria, he would certainly have destroyed it, or forced its surrender, in the delta of the Nile.

58. oldal, Chasing Napoleon

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy

robertbardos P>!

The law of frequency reveals that, in English, E is the most commonly written letter, followed by A, and so on. Frequency tables, known to all cryptologists, provide a ready means of decipherment. Frequencies are different in other languages – Z, rare in English, is common in Polish – but the tables cannot be defeated.

170. oldal, Crete: Foreknowledge No Help

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy

robertbardos P>!

Because, however, of the difficulty the Japanese found in distributing new additive books across their enormous area of conquest, individual transmitters made mistake, which may be called classic mistake so often has it betrayed encryptors, of transmitting messages in both the old and the new code, to ensure accuracy of reception. The Americans, able to read the old code, were thereby enabled to read some of the new, so that by late May they had estabilished the outline of their enemy’s developing plan.

232. oldal, Midway: The Complete Intelligence Victory?

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy

robertbardos P>!

It has become part of the conventional wisdom that intelligence is the neccessary key to success in military operations. A wise opinion would be that intelligence, while generally neccessary, is not a sufficient means to victory. Decision in war is always the result of a fight and in combat willpower always counts for more than foreknowledge. Let those who disagree show otherwise.

28. oldal, Knowledge of the Enemy

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy

robertbardos P>!

Both the V-1, the first cruise missile, and the V-2, the direct technical ancestor of all extra-atmospheric missiles and of the space rockets, were far in advance of any aeronautical weapon produced by their enemies in 1939-45. Wernher von Braun, who was to become an American citizen and to be celebrated as ‘the father of the space programme’, was a scientific genius. The men who produced the V-1 were aeronautical technicians of the first class. Had Hitler had the vision to devote a proportion of Germany’s scientific effort similar to that given to other weapon programmes to nuclear weapons, it is possible that, with the V-weapons, he could have won the war.

336. oldal, Human Intelligence and Secret Weapons

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy

robertbardos P>!

Strategically, the First World War, as a naval war, was to be dominated by the new invention of witeless. Coronel and the Falklands, unlike any other naval battles of 1914-18 though they were, belong to an emerging pattern. Before 1914 fleets at war operated in their search for each other as they had always done, working by line of sight and visual signal. After 1914, intelligence gathered by line of sight could be transmitted to infinite distance at the speed of light. Navies would take time to understand and implement the potentialities of the new technology.

162-163. oldal, Wireless Intelligence

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy

robertbardos P>!

The Luftwaffe’s general-purpose key, it was first cracked on 6 January 1940, five months before the opening of the Battle of France, and was thereafter consistently broken until the end of the war, soon quite quickly on the day of use itself and then in real time; that is, as quickly as it was decrypted by its intended German recipients.

185. oldal, Crete: Foreknowledge No Help

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy

robertbardos P>!

A battle conducted on the basis of replacing losses faster than they can be inflicted is, however, a sterile and dispiriting business.

280. oldal, Intelligence, One Factor Among Many

John Keegan: Intelligence in War The value–and limitations–of what the military can learn about the enemy


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